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THE COMMON GROUND OF LIBERALISM AND
FUNDAMENTALISM.
BY C. O. WEBER.
DESPITE the issues of "fundamentalism" waged in the Baptist
Church and to a lesser extent in others, there are propitious
signs that we are once more to have a religion of the spirit in place
of a religion of the word. Strange that the church should ever
entertain the dangerous fallacy that the theological formulation of
ideals in language is to realize them in fact. While for the most
part the energy of the church has gone into a vain attempt to ex-
press the most sacred attitudes of life in the dialectic of theology, her
spirit has found no other exercise than the rather flaccid one
afforded by oyster suppers and the sale of haberdashery. The
church has fallen into discredit to the extent that she has been sat-
isfied with the role as conserver of doctrine. It cannot be denied
that the church has devoted much of her interest to the develop-
ment of an elaborate theology to justify the crude, mythological
aspects of her faith. And it is a theology well calculated to exas-
perate the man of thought and to leave the mind of the average
layman with the vague notion that Christianity is nothing more than
some sort of "manifesto of piety" whose essence consists in its
opposition to the other manifestos of Buddha and Confucius. Thus,
the church has degenerated to the role of protectionism. Then,
singularly enough, as though aware that all of her theological learn-
ing is as a card-board structure built on quicksand, she urges that
religion must be accepted on faith, as though faith signified an in-
tellectual suicide for the sake of some good that cannot be attained
otherwise. With her 'cloak of infallibility torn to shreds by higher
criticism, with a top-heavy theology which few understand, and
which none in their hearts believe except those who are graciously
predisposed to be convinced, with a rule of faith which, as some-
one observes, possesses the doubtful virtue of "being useful be-
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cause it is incredible", the church has indeed fallen into bad straits.
It has been aptly stated that it were as though a moss-grown ortho-
doxy, seeking compensation for its incapacity to learn, devoted
itself to a grim determination not to forget. The shell of theology
which religion unwittingly entered has become a prison house.
Men turn from the church because they reject the three-story
universe which theologians discuss so profoundly. This is the
natural result of the attempt to make the Bible, which is a literature
of power, into a literature of knowledge.
But it appears that another era is upon us when we again see
many things "as through a glass darkly." From all directions come
prophesies of "the religion of the future' and the prophets of the
new do not often employ the traditional epithets. Indeed, the Chris-
tianity of today is following two tendencies, and examination will
show that both of them are headed towards religious bankruptcy.
On the one hand, the Catholic Pope has reaffirmed the eternal truth
of catholic supernaturalism with all of its paraphrenalia of beads,
censors, crosses, chasubles and holy water. Masses are still as real
in their efficacy as inferno is real in its terrors ; and purgatory and
paradise still hold forth their promise. On the other hand, the
"liberal spirits", such as Charles E. Eliot and Abbe Loisy are
waxing eloquent about what they call the "new orthodoxy" and
"the religion of the future." The inner content of their religion
appears as a simple piety in place of the angels, devils and saints of
Catholicism.
True religion, it would seem, should sanction both an object
and an attitude of loyalty toward it. Yet religion threatens to
break asunder with Catholicism holding blindly to the object while
the liberals take possession of mere loyalty—of mere attitude with-
out any object whatever. This development was foreshadowed by
the recent furore in philosophy concerning the merits and demerits
of pragmatism. Scholastic theism in general and Hegelianism in
particular have sought to compel belief in the tenets of religion as a
rational necessity. The pragmatists in general with William James
in particular have sought to justify religion solely on the strength
of its practical necessity. Thus, a faith so highly rationalized and
generalized that it fails to satisfy anyone in particular, as an average
coat would fail to fit any man, has been opposed to the theory that
"the axes of reality run solely through the egoistic places."^
1 Citations from James are taken from his Vai-ieties of Religious Ex-
perience.
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It is instructive to note the diverse views of God that are held
by these opposed views. The God of absolute idealism, whom
James terms a "metaphysical monster" is replaced by a "pallid
adumbration of a spiritual universe" with which we need to es-
tablish "union or harmonious relation." Then, as though realizing
the thinness of this concept, James sanctions the "overbeliefs"
which will give more objectivity to this too highly attenuated a bit
of empiricism, which, however, "is objectively true so far as it
goes."
Thus, the spiritual universe of James is only able to get con-
tent by an injection of the overbehefs that are purely individual in
their origin. He even volunteers such an overbelief of his own in
which he attributes to the spiritual reality, which remains after re-
jecting theological trappings, goodness and personality. These
overbeliefs he admits to be "somewhat of a pallid kind" as is fitting
to a philosopher. Thus, the spiritual universe of James free from
all overbeliefs is not one whit better than the "metaphysical mon-
ster" he condemns, since both alike are conceived to satisfy theo-
retical interests. It can become dynamic only by the addition of the
overbeliefs and these are by hypothesis the additions of individual
human beings. In this view, religion becomes true in more than a
metaphysical sense only by becoming of practical value. This in
none other than the philosophical version of the tendency of the
present day prophets of whom I have already spoken. Schleier-
macher's conception of religion as predominantly a volitional and
moral experience with a reward all its own, is a typical exemplar of
the liberal tendency.
In seeking to resolve these oppositions we may proceed in two
ways. If our bias is historical, and our attitude conservative, we are
inclined to declare that when religion becomes detached from such
conceptions as that of God and His Divine attributes, it ceases to be
religion, though it may lay claim to be an ethical system. If our
bias is for individuality and progress (understood to mean change)
we will declare against this conservatism that it is an unbecoming
Chinese ancestor-worship or a stubborn nominalism which forgets
meanings in its excessive devotion to conceptualism.
If, with the "fundamentalists", we seek to determine wdiat
religion is by discovering the "essence" or common element that
the religions of the past have exhibited, we engage in a futile un-
dertaking. There is no agreement among those considered com-
petent in this task that have enabled us to say with certainty what
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the content of religion is or what its true symptoms are ; and Emile
Boutroux has well observed that from the viewpoint of psychology
the essence of religion is no other essence than ignorance. If we
are to seek for the "essence" of religion, we should begin by purg-
ing the word of a certain fixed bias that lurks in it. Heretofore it
has been assumed that the essence of religion consists in some
belief that all religions hold in common. In this case, they were
possibly doomed to failure at the very outset for it is conceivable
that the essence of religion may not at all inhere in some rational
belief ; and, indeed, comparative religion presents us with an array
of types—some affirming God and some denying him ; some affirm-
ing an after-life, others denying it; some with well defined moral
codes, others without them.
Fortunately, there is an entirely different viewpoint from which
we may approach religion ; and this viewpoint, I think, will end in
something other than the barren results of the ordinary method
of comparative research. It is clearly set forth by Emile Boutroux
in the article already referred to. Of the attempt to comprehend
religion in terms of a concept that will exhibit the common char-
acteristics of all religions, Boutroux speaks as follows:
"To content oneself with this concept in deciding whether
religion subsists or is to subsist, is to regard existence, pure and
simple, as adequate without enquiring into its quality We
must note that both in everyday life, and in philosophical reflec-
tion, we have constantly to deal not with concept but with idea.
When we speak of the future of art and science, of democracy,
and socialism, we are not thinking of them as actually given or
presented, or as they would be defined in a logical generalization
:
we assuredly have in mind the thought of what science and de-
mocracy can and ought to be, to attain to full realization, i. e., not
the concept but the idea of science or democracy." ^
Let me exemplify the differences involved when we consider
the issue between the liberals and the orthodox, first by the con-
ceptual method, and then by the method proposed by Boutroux.
To the orthodox in general religion involves a type of belief and
conduct whose sanction is Divine; whereas to the liberals the re-
ligious' life involves a type of conduct whose sanction is human
well-being. To decide which of the two deserves to be called re-
ligion, we should ask, "What difference in meaning is involved by
a life of loyalty to God or a life of loyalty to humanity?" This
2 "The Essence of Religion", Monist, July 1921, pp. 337-349.
LIBERALISM AND FUNDAMENTALISM. 645
plan of campaign, however, is far from being as simple as its
statement would indicate. To look for the difference in meaning
that God has for the orthodox and that philanthropy has for the
liberals is in the end hopeless ; for though they admit of the com-
mon denominator of "dearness", this quality is notoriously incom-
mensurable. Similarly, to look for the difference that may exist
in the practical lives of the liberal and the orthodox, as pragmatism
would do, is equally hopeless ; for though the practical life may be
measurable in a quantitative sense, they are, as quantities, without
any meaning or value. This lands us in the dilemma of being un-
able to decide, from the conceptual view, whether the orthodox or
the liberals set forth the true meaning of religion. The failure is
due to the fact that it either forces us to adopt a criterion of re-
ligion to begin with (typically, the historical criterion) or else leads
us to formulations without inner substance. That is, if we set out
with the belief that true religion consists in the "worship of God".
we ensnare ourselves in the common error that this phrase has an
unvarying and unmistakable meaning ; and this is precisely the issue
that is raised by the liberalists.
The fact that they are in dispute is so far the only result con-
cerning which the orthodox and the liberals can agree. Yet, there
must be some more substantial agreement between them that con-
ceptualism cannot evaluate, still less discover. There is another
fact that both liberals and the orthodox have overlooked in their
zeal, and that is. the dumb acknowledgement of each that somehozv
their differences arc not final, and that it zvcrc a blessing to all if
there could be some understanding. Have we not here already a sym-
pathetic agreement, fundamental in the lives of men, which if
brought to light by some method of magic would explain away the
differences that are so insistent on the intellectual plane? It is
indeed some blessing inarticulately hoped for that animates their
argument. Can the intellect show them the common measure of
excellence they look for in their religious lives? We have seen
that it cannot. Is perhaps the intellect responsible for the fact that
they have differences at all? In answer to these questions, let us
consider in turn the objections each disputant has of the others re-
ligion.
The orthodox object that the liberal insistance on human wel-
fare and its neglect of the attributes and will of God involves the
contradiction that we shall find in humanity something better than
human—the contradiction of mankind lifting itself by its own boot-
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straps. The orthodox cannot conceive of striving except in terms
of two levels, one human and the other super-human. The liberals,
on the other hand, will complain that the orthodox conception only
seems to provide the better things to our hopes : that the two levels
of orthodoxy, the human and the Divine, fail to function after all
for they are levels that are different in kind and not in degree. One
is limited, the other unlimited : there can be no transition from the
one to the other. God is perfectly good while man is only partially
good ; and between them there is no common measure just as there
is no common measure between miles and an infinite space. How
the human and the Divine can enter into the same experience is in-
conceivable if one occupies an absolute and the other a finite realm.
Coutroux would find in the very natures of the orthodox and
liberal the "energizer" that their intellects failed to find. The in-
tellect will always express a functional relationship in terms of
levels—as a transition of stages. As a method of describing the
occurrence this method may be satisfactory enough; but we are
seeking to understand how it may be experienced. This view leaves
us with the insoluble contradiction as to how the static realm of
heaven and the dynamic realm of human affairs can articulate with
each other. It is the contradiction of how perfect rest can hinder
or aid human progress ; of how perfection can help, still less
sympathize with, imperfection ; of how perfect wisdom can under-
stand ignorance. Such contradictions are not peculiar to theology
alone but arise whenever we seek to conceive dynamism of any
kind in the language of conceptualism. What actually occurs in
the lives of men is not an inexplicable jump from one state to
another ; but rather a creative process which at once makes new
levels as it arrives at them. Needless to say this is an insoluble
paradox to the intellect ; but it has nevertheless a logic of its own
as certain of verification as is the principle of contradiction upon
which all formal logic rests.
Applying this solution to the chronic differences between the
way popes and philanthropists conceive religion, w^e would say that
popes after all are right in declaring that religion must embody
more than complacent average opinion aspires to. Yet, the ex-
ponents of the "religion of humanity" are also right in demanding
that worship be more than is afforded by an eternally complete God.
A complete religion, as we said heretofore, must involve both an
object and an attitude, a hope and at once a fulfillment, a realization
which is still a resolve. But these cannot be discovered in terms
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of logical externality, for here a simultaneous identity and differ-
ence cannot exist. It is only on the psychological level that this is
possible : for it is here that we have change and yet identity, a sub-
ject who is undeniably at the same time an object. It is in sub-
jective life that we find simultaneously the sense of something lack-
ing and the possession of this something (in degree and not in
part). In short, it is in immediate experience that the religion of
the future may find the common grounds of all faiths which it has
consistently failed to find when it employs dialectic.
The objection is invariably urged that immediate experience is
inutterable; but the whole issue turns upon the consideration of
whether in religion this is not a virtue rather than a fault. Some
form of utterance it indeed has—the utterance of deeds. It finds
voice, not intermittently as do arguments in a debate, but con-
tinuously in action. The intellect first gets its evidence and then
believes, said Saint Anselm. but in religion we must believe first and
then come to understand. So it is by living the life of Christ that
we shall come to understand Christianity. Yet, it is not impos-
sible to describe that life in words.
The fundamental fact in the lives of men everywhere is their
conviction, whether articulate or inutterable, that life is essentially
creative in nature. The very first verse of Scripture has therefore
sounded the essential nature and mission of God in saying that
God created the world. The stamp of the Divine sonship of man
consists in the fact that he also can create. Theology spoiled the
account by referring it to a point in time, whereas creation is
omnipresent wherever there is life, and Bergson has been able to
show that mental processes are inexplicable unless we suppose its
presence. The creative aspect of life has always escaped science
which by its very method is destined to make of all history a re-
threshing of old straw, a redistribution of elements given once for
all. It was in deference to a tyrannical intellectualism that made the
law of conservation its cornerstone, that led religionists to the sub-
terfuge that creation is a fact but a "miraculous"' one. It is high
time to give to religion the benefit of the fact that creationism is
just as verified a fact in the universe as is conservationism. In
social and psychological science the fact of creation is just as neces-
sary as an hypothesis as is the law of conservation in exact science.
But in the lives of ordinary men, creation is not a theory, but a
responsibility—it is their natural religion. Religion is the over-
whelming conviction that our powers exist and that they must be
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expressed, that we must strive, however hopeless victory may seem.
The true foe of religion, as Wilm observes, is not naturalism, but
the mechanical absolutism of science which makes striving a de-
ceptive appearance; or an absolute intellectualism which defeats our
powers by representing all problems as solved.^ That our hopes
are realizable is assurance enough for the soul not addicted to the
sickness of metaphysical grubbing about the question as to
whether or not the good is really predominant in the universe. Dr.
McTaggart declared that the important problem for any philosophy
of religion is the question, "Is the world on the whole good or
bad ?" Well, this may continue to be the concern of the philosophy
of religion, but as for the religion of the rest of mankind the ques-
tion is rather, "can the world on the whole be changed from the
bad to the good ?" To this question there is an answer in the heart
of every person. We have the assurance that we do indeed possess
such transforming powers ; and if the content of religion must be
a belief, surely it is this one. That life is a creative enterprise is
indeed the common conviction of all mankind unless we except
those who find in the very philosophy of determinism a field where
their creative imaginations may expend their zeal. When we once
possess and understand this idea of creationism we may wholly
dispense with theology and its "levels" as the misapplication of a
spatial concepts to facts of the psychological order where they can
only be vicious metaphors.
Were this theme of freedom the concern of man only in his
political affairs it might well continue to be the theme soley of
dissertations on politics, statescraft and economics. But to the
spiritual genius of mankind it is more than this. The theme of
freedom is the theme of all life—it is the moving spirit of religion.
Said Boutroux, "The originality of religion lies in the fact that
it proceeds not from power to duty but from duty to power ; that it
advances resolutely, taking for granted that the problem is solved,
and that it starts from God. ''Ab actu, ab posse", such is its motto.
"Be of good cheer", said Jesus to Pascal, "thou wouldst not seek me
hadst thou not found me". God is being and principle, the over-
flowing spring of perfection and might. He who shares in the
life of God can really transcend nature; he can create. Religion is
creation, true, beautiful and benificent, in God and by God."
3 E. C. Wilm, Henri Bergson, A Study in Radical Evolution, p. 149.
